'What factors have contributed to the success of the LDP?'

Below is the completed essay on Japanese post-war politics. I handed it in today.
The term is now officially over and I'll have to start thinking about the rest of the year. I'm planning on moving up NorthEast (as mentioned in previous posts), taking a part-time job doing whatever and concentrating on writing the rest of the time. I recently had an article published by a newspaper in Finland. It came as a total surprise that they would publish it, but now they've asked me for more articles on British and Japanese politics and culture, so I figured I'd give it a go. I'm hoping that it'll be easier to get stories published in the summer, which is usually a slower season for newspapers. I'm obviously not cut out for anything that requires a normal attention-span anyway, so I'll see what happens on this job front.

Here is my essay in all its glory: (it's long, so scroll down for the rest of the stuff)
"What factors have contributed to the success of the LDP and how significant have they been?"


Introduction
1. The LDP and the structures of Japanese Democracy
1.1 The ‘iron triangle’
1.2 The many facets of the LDP
2. Some weaknesses of the opposition
Conclusion

Introduction
If one looks at post-war election results in post-1955 Japan it quickly becomes obvious that the opposition parties have been spectacularly unsuccessful in their quest for power: only once has a party other than the LDP been granted the public mandate to form a government. I believe that not only is the LDP doing something very right, but that the major opposition parties, or the left, are simultaneously doing something very wrong.
Because of the diversity of the opposition I am tempted to divide the ideological map of political Japan simply into Left and Right: the one in opposition and the other one in government. The recent history of political parties is far too complicated to relate in a short essay, and the major leftist parties have been in opposition while the LDP has formed a government, although sometimes in coalition with smaller centre-right or rightist parties. Currently (after the 9/11, 2005 elections) the LDP leads a coalition government with New Komeito, with five smaller parties in opposition. The biggest of the opposition party is the DPJ with 113 seats to the LDP's 296 seats, followed by JCP with 9 seats and SDP with 7 seats. The coalition companion New Komeito holds 31 seats. Out of a total of 480 seats in the Lower House, then, the two government parties hold 327 seats (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japan_general_election,_2005).

Firstly, looking at the structure of the LDP may offer one possible answer to why the LDP is so succesful. The LDP has had ample time (since its establishment in 1955) to cement the relationships between the corporate world, the bureaucracy and itself to form the so-called ‘iron triangle’ which many writers have identified as the underlying power structure of the Japanese society (see, for example, Stockwin). The LDP has also a very strong internal structure which emphasises networking with both the business world and the bureaucracy. Even though I cannot go into much depth in this matter, it should also be mentioned that the electoral system of the post-war period until electoral reform in 1994 operated in effect to keep Japan a one-party-dominant nation (Hrebenar (2000), p. 38).
Secondly, one must look at the ideological and structural challenges facing the Japanese left. The support of the idealistic left has dwindled steadily since the late sixties, and although the opposition has been able to influence government policy, the underlying ideology of the left does not seem to be broad enough in scope to allow for a government with the full and ideologically legitimate capacity that a government needs: the LDP ‘ideology’ is far more flexible and adaptable to changing realities than the more narrow idealism of the opposition.
One must also take into account the nature of Japanese political culture in a historical context. This, in my view, is the most challenging area of all to examine objectively, not least because so much has been written about the ‘exceptional’ political culture of Japan. I agree that Japanese political culture is exceptional, and I would argue that the reason for this is the legal basis on which all Japanese political agents act: the current Constitution. No other highly successful modern state has had quite such legal restrictions placed on its political activities. This restriction has rendered the ideological premise of the opposition, and particularly the parties on the left, incompatible with the many realities of Japanese politics.

1. The LDP and the structures of Japanese Democracy
Only on one occasion has a party other than the LDP been in power since the end of WWII, in 1993. The 1993 coalition government was hailed as a victory for the non-LDP parties, but as Sarah Hyde demonstrates, the main opposition party (DJP) actually lost half of its seats in the 1993 election (in Kersten, Williams (2006) p. 97). The ‘victory’ of the opposition was simply due to the LDP losing even more seats in the Diet than the main opposition party did, so although a momentary collapse of a LDP majority in the Diet, it seems that it was not the turning point for the left many had hoped for. More recent elections in 2003 and 2005 have confirmed this seemingly terminal downturn in the appeal of non-LDP parties (Junji Banno, in Kersten, Williams, 162-163). Neither has Ozawa Ichiro’s mid-1990’s vision of a move towards two-party parliamentarism been realized (Stockwin, 155-156). The political change in1993 and the resulting reform of the electoral system have been predicted to bring LDP dominance in Japanese politics to an end (see, for example Kohno (1997)), but according to Hrebenar (2000), the LDP has prospered and even gained signifiance in the policy making processes since then, partly due to the decline of the bureaucracy and businesses, but also because of canny politics (pp.140-141).

1.1 The ‘Iron Triangle’
The so-called iron triangle is often quoted as one of the main reasons for the hegemony of the LDP and the ruling status quo in general (see, for example, Johnson (1995)). The 'iron triangle' describes the tripartite alliance between the LDP, the business conglomerates and the bureaucracy. These close ties have developed through Japan’s post-war focus on economic development supported by a strong interventionist state, the traditionally high status and law-making capacity of the bureaucracy, and the educational homogenity amongst the ruling elite. It reflects both tradition and continuity but also an innovative form of governance which aimed to strengthen Japan economically. Prime minister Hayato Ikeda's economic policies in the 1960's helped to consolidate these relations (Preston, 2000), and the political power of the LDP is at least partly attributable to its strong links to both money and bureaucratic power. For example Sheridan (quoted in Preston (2000), p. 95) notes that the networks that grew out of fostering economic growth have continued as lobby mechanisms for certain interest groups, and the structure of the party certainly reflects this interdependency (see 1.2 below).
I would describe it as an institutional arrangement between chosen interest groups, state favoured businesses, the leading party LDP and the bureaucracy, in order to further a national strategy of economism. The strong links are upheld by customs such as amakudari, where retired bureaucrats take positions within businesses, who receive in return good links to the bureaucracy, who in turn cooperate with the LDP to further policies that might be favourable to aforementioned businesses. There is a strong human factor at work in the iron triangle phenomenon.

1.2 The many facets of the LDP
In addition to strong and long-standing relations with the bureaucracy and business, the LDP as a party has a broad and effective organization that is difficult to challenge. In addition to factions (habatsu), the LDP fosters policy expertise through policy groups (zoku), where LDP politicians regardless of factional loyalties get together to form and discuss future policies in, for example, education or foreign policy.
The zoku are organised around the Policy Research Affairs Council, which supports through its research and cooperation with ministries and agencies the specific policy interests of LDP governments and helps to provide a back-bone for the arguments of the government in every-day parliamentary politics (LDP homepage, http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/english/overview/07.html , accessed on 13.6.2006).
The LDP began to factionalize in the early Sixties, splitting into several groupings that were led by rivaling would-be leaders within the party. (Thayer (1969), pp. 41-47; Kohno (1997), pp. 91-104). Factions have acted as an important breeding ground and platform for future leaders of the party (Kohno (1997) p. 102-104). According to the LDP, they 'have helped to ensure the smooth transition of power and authority between successive generations and facilitated policy change in ways that have periodically reinvigorated the party' (LDP homepage, http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/english/overview/10.html , accessed on 13.6.2006). Personnel matters and choosing the leader of the party are very much a matter for factions.
Factions can rightly be described as 'parties within a party' (Hrebenar (2000) p.106). They have several roles in addition to the ones described above: factions are also vital for raising funds for the party, and by offering different options for the electorate they reduce the need
for voters to switch parties in elections. Both Curtis (1999) and Hrebenar (2000) consider the latter a significant cultural factor in the success of the LDP. Factions give the LDP a dynamic quality where different factions compete against eachother much as if they were separate parties. Even if factional rivalries and loyalties have occasionally threatened to split the party (as happened before the 1993 elections), a fear of destroying the entire party and consequently suffering a loss of power seems to keep factions in a rivalrous union (Hrebenar (2000) pp. 118-123).
The zoku are another example of the strong internal structure of the LDP. The Policy Research Affairs Council has an important role in the policy making process, as according to LDP bylaws all matters relating to policy affairs must first be examined by PARC. The different divisions of PARC process proposals for policy from both various interest groups and the bureaucracy, and it is customary for all law proposals to be examined and accepted by PARC, before being submitted to the Diet. PARC is thus another example of how enmeshed the relations between the LDP and the bureaucracy are in the policymaking process (and thus part of the 'iron triangle). The zoku are literally 'tribes' of Diet members which have formed in and around the different divisions of PARC. Zoku politicians in the different PARC divisions have the opportunity to gain significant expertise in specialised policy questions and cultivate close relations with different interest groups (Hrebenar (2000), pp. 137-139). PARC and the zoku thus make the LDP a very powerful policy making agency and an important target for lobbyists. Zoku and habatsu are generally targeted as undemocratic and seen to serve particularistic interests, giving rise to claims of Japanese politics being 'backwards'. Curtis (1999, p.54) observes that such criticism brews in the gap between normative ideas of what politics 'should' be, and how it works in reality. Politics and democracy is very much about the furthering of one's particular interests, contributing thus to the multitude of voices that should be heard by the decision makers.


2. Some weaknesses of the opposition
The LDP has over the last four decades transformed itself successfully into a catch-all party with a pragmatic image (Curtis (1999), pp. 30-31, 36), and Japanese voters seem to appreciate the sense of stability and continuity that a LDP-led government is seen to represent (Hrebenar (2000) pp. 10-15). One of the greatest weaknesses of the opposition is that it is so fragmented. An election victory by non-LDP parties would always result in a multi-party government with no one strong party in charge of policy (Hrebenar, (2000) p. 13). The only example of how a non-LDP government would be formed is from 1993. It was the result of no one party gaining majority, and consisted of all parties (7) but for the LDP and JCP (Kohno (1997) p. 142). This type of election result would always put great emphasis on the explicit pre-election commitments of parties and the post-election bargaining powers of both parties and individual politicians, who would be running a high risk of not getting into a possible coalition government at all. Kohno Masaru (1997) developed a microanalytic rational-choice explanation for the formation of the non-LDP government. The 1993 election was preceded by internal trouble within the LDP, and partly as a result of this several parties, including new ones established by high-profile LDP dissidents) ran with the clear explicit intent to form a non-LDP government. This was in itself a risk, because although the LDP had been weakened by internal splits and scandals and was not expected to win a clear majority, these parties renounced from the start the possibility to form a coalition government with the LDP. However, it was left to the parties that had not made pre-election commitments either way to actually form the government: they were not the biggest parties, but as a result of non-allegiance they had the greatest leverage in the Diet (the bargaining process that led to the formation of the Hosokawa government is related in full in Kohno (1997), pp 145-156). Outright opposition of the LDP thus left the bigger opposition parties SDP and the DPJ in a narrow barganing position with little leverage, while the smaller NJP and Sakigake, which held the balance of power, were in a position to choose between the LDP or the non-LDP parties to form a government. LDP election strategy, on the other hand, has been described as 'divide and conquer' in relation to the opposition parties (Curtis1999). No single other party than the LDP is very likely to win an election by a majority, and therefore an election strategy that aims explicitly for a non-LDP government would by definition be a very risky attempt for opposition parties. The 1993 election is often seen as a sign of true political change, but the past decade shows that even in an era of coalition governments, the LDP still stays in power. Curtis (1999, 26-30) points out that the short-lived change of government in 1993 was still accompanied by continuity in public policy. Furthermore, Curtis identifies a strong trend of complacency in Japanese politics. Not only the conservative electorate, but the political leaders and the bureaucrats alike are apprehensive to dramatic policy change (p.28).
However, the 1993 change sparked reforms in the oppositional parties, especially those on the left. The DPJ has since taken the step from oppositional politics to a more government-orientated attitude, and has moved significantly away from the 'old left' (Nakano Koichi in Williams, Kersten eds. (2005) pp. 94-95). Some of the prennial policy platforms of the left (decentralisation, information disclosure and parliamentary accountability) have received attention by governments especially in the past decade (pp. 83-87), but only after the left was ideologically in terminal decline (p.88). Nakano sees these policy platforms as being central to the left not because of any purely ideological reasons, but because of the situational position as an opposition to the LDP. Nakano argues that there is nothing inherently leftist about these policies, but that they are fairly universal oppositional rhetoric (p.84). With the decline of the left and of ideological differences in general, the LDP has been more ready to adopt what used to be some of the strongest arguments of the opposition (Sarah Hyde in Kersten, Williams eds (2005) p 108); and Hrebenar (2000, p. 141) would not be surprised if we saw in Japanese politics another long era of LDP dominance.
The DPJ, currently the biggest opposition party, commits itself to upholding pacifism as a fundamental principle of the constitution (DPJ homepage, http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/about_us/philosophy.html , accessed on 15.06.2006). As mentioned earlier, the 'New Left' has taken significant steps to the right, but has lost many of its key arguments to the LDP, rendering it weak. Opposing the amendment of Article 9 of the Constitution and upholding pacifism, or at least military inaction as a leading norm, are still fundamental principles for the left.
There is no mistaking that international politics and Japan's role in the world has become a bigger domestic political question than it has perhaps ever been in post-war history. In recent years the Japanese government under PM Koizumi has decided to uphold its obligations under the Japan-U.S Security Treaty by sending SDF troops to Afghanistan and Iraq. Furthermore, the weak position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the political sphere and it's many organisational weaknesses (Hook et al (2005) pp. 48-49) also contribute to the fact that international policy is formulated by the individual politicians who happen to be in power, and not as much by the bureaucracy. The proactive stance of LDP leaders in this area has left the opposition to simply oppose action. David Williams (Kersten, Williams, eds. (2005), p.55) describes pithily and provocatively that pacifism as constitutional theory is the denial of sovereignty, and in metaphysical terms, it is the denial of subjectivity. In political terms, it is a politics of constant dependence and an evasion of power.( In constitutional terms, Williams' assertion borrows from Carl Schmitt's constitutional theory, and in metaphysical terms from Hobbes' idea on the nature of man (pp. 48-49 ). On a political level, human beings are not to be trusted with subjectivity, but must be 'contained' by an external authority. Nakano Koichi's description of the opposition as opposing situationally rather than ideologically would confirm that Williams' argument has some bearing: looking at the mere structure of the LDP apparatus it would be difficult to challenge, but here we hear the argument that the left does not want to be in power, because it would be against its own ideological premise.

Conclusion:
I have highlighted two characteristics of the Japanese political landscape which I consider to be two of the most relevant in answering the essay question: the strong structure of the LDP and the weaknesses of the opposition. Underpinning these factors is the conservative and periodically complacent attitude that the electorate has towards politics and governance. The economism (or GDP-ism) of the LDP has arguably been the cornerstone of one of the biggest economic success stories in the world. It has helped to shape not only the political system, but also the image of the LDP as a pragmatic party.
'Ideologically' the LDP, due to its tradition, the established 'iron triangle' and its flexibility due to its many factions is better at handling the vacuum of power, or 'collective irresponsibility' that Japan has repeatedly been discovered to suffer from. Stockwin (1999) sees this apparently stale status quo as a crisis of political power, where the monopoly position of the LDP is no longer justified but where a sufficiently stable alternative system is yet to be found (pp. 8-9). This is only partly true. I do not think the failure of the left is simply systemic, but also ideological, underpinned by Japan's political traditions and culture.


Bibliography:
Christensen, Ray (1989), Ending the LDP Hegemony, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press
Curtis, Gerald L. (1988), The Japanese way of Politics, New York: Columbia University Press
Curtis, Gerald L. (1999), The Logic of Japanese Politics, New York: Columbia University Press
Herzog Peter J. (1993), Japan’s pseudo-democracy, Kent: Japan Library
Hrebenar, Ronald J. (2000), Japan's New Party System, Westview Press
Hook, Gilson, Hughes, Dobson (2005, 2nd ed.) Japan's international relations, London, New York: Routledge
Johnson, Chalmers (1995), Japan: Who Governs? New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company
Kersten Rikki, Williams David (eds.) (2006), The Left in the Shaping of Japanese Democracy, London and New York: Routledge
Kohno Masaru (1997), Japan’s Postwar Party Politics, Princeton, Princeton University Press
Najita Tetsuo (1974), Japan: the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Japanese Politics, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press
Pempel, T.J (1998), Regime Shift: Comparative Dynamics of the Japanese Political Economy, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press
Preston, P.W (2000), Understanding Modern Japan. A Political Economy of Development, Culture and Global Power, London: Sage Publications
Stockwin J.A.A (1975, 3rd ed 1999), Governing Japan: Divided Politics in a Major Economy, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers
Thayer Nathaniel B (1969), How the Conservatives rule Japan, Princeton: Princeton University Press
Watanuki Joji (1977), Politics in Postwar Japanese Society, Tokyo: Tokyo University Press
Internet sources:
LDP Homepage http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/english/
- on factions: http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/english/overview/10.html
http://www.japanesepoliticians.com
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japan_general_election%2C_2005

2-0, 1-0

Go England! Enjoy it while you can: next Tuesday you'll get mangled by Sweden... :) who, I just read, won 1-0 over Paraguay! Two of my three home teams are doing okay so far, but Japan is playing Croatia on Sunday. Now there's a worry...

Education + Me = -1

I seem to have a complete block when it comes to writing academic essays - I can't do it. I love studying, but suck at it so much that it's unbelievable. No-one is suggesting I'd stay to do a PhD anymore, which is both a relief and really depressing. I've obviously not done as well as people think I could've done. I haven't done anywhere near as well as I think I should've done. University is too confusing for me, I suck and I'm obviously not bright enough to complete a degree.
The dissappointment of not being good at something I'm really quite passionate about, and the demoralising effect of not being able to study, are driving me up the wall right now. But, I have work to do. I have a crap essay to save (see below), so I have to stop whinging now. And no, being good at something else will not alleviate the dissappointment or negate the impact that feelings of failure have on my self-confidence, like some people have suggested.

Newcastle/Gateshead revisited

My weekend in Newcastle was a welcome break from Sheffield. I stayed with good friends and generally just fell more in love with the place. And yes, I have visited Newcastle in wintertime, so it's not just the sun and heat messing with my mind.

I noticed a clear Norwegian presence in Newcastle. I've heard that they go shopping there, which doesn't surprise me in the least.
I'm considering moving to Newcastle or Gateshead after this term, but the reason is neither the Norwegians nor the good shopping. I would just rather choose to live somewhere I feel comfortable than feeling forced to move to yet another new place. I need and want to stay in Britain for at least another year, so why not try life in Newcastle? I'm not worried about getting a job, they're thirteen to a dozen in Britain.

Le Weekend:
Friday. I was braindead all day from having taken an exam in the morning.
I had forgotten to tell my friend Daria that I was coming over so she was a bit surprised when I turned up at her work in the afternoon. She knew I was probably coming, so she half-expected to see me that afternoon, but still. I just assumed I had told her. Luckily she's not the type of person to go all English about surprise house guests (sorry, but I do find middle-class Englanders right stiff and inflexible about certain things). She's supremely easy going and it was great seeing her again. As soon as she was done with work we went to Blackfriars' for a couple of glasses of wine and a chat before Daria's boyfriend Dan came to join us for some more wine and chat. I made a stupid first impression on Dan (due, perhaps, to all that wine). The bottom line was that Dan's cool and I'm a nerd.
Saturday was spent shopping. I usually hate shopping, but with Daria shopping is a pleasure. She will tell me honestly what she thinks, I can do the same for her, and there will be no hard feelings anywhere in sight. She also understands my need for coffee breaks. We both love fashion, but I can't quite cope with crowded shops. Her honesty and good eye for fashion makes shopping a quick and relaxed deal.

It was nice and quiet in the city centre on Saturday, because most people were somewhere else watching the England game. After a lot of successful shopping, Daria and I went for a Chinese and a loooong chat, after which we decided to go back to D's place. We were both exhausted and the footie had just ended so people were pouring out on the streets from the pubs. We got an indication of what 'Toon' would be like that evening and decided unanimously on a quiet night in. As we were waiting for the bus to Bensham, a so-drunk-he-could-barely-stand England fan decided he needed a pee. Unfortunately he was too drunk to find his way anywhere to use the toilet, so he pulled his dick out, leaned against a rubbish bin and relieved himself. He then tried to look inconspicuous for about twenty minutes, leaning over the bin (his penis still in the bin) as if he was just looking at passers-by or perhaps waiting for a cab. Everyone, a good dozen of us, standing waiting for buses just next to him, saw exactly what he was doing. I'd be the last person to stone a sinner but... it's just one of those little things that make me want to spend a saturday night 'home' in Bensham rather than around the Bigg market.
On Saturday night I watched tv. 'Erin Brockovich' was okay, but if law was always that exciting I would've become a lawyer, too. 99,9999999 per cent of legal cases do not make for much drama, nor do they manage to pull off the whole justice-for-the-little-guy gag that often, and certainly not on that scale. I went to bed and slept well.
Sunday was sun-day. Daria and I drove to Tynemouth and enjoyed the sun and the sea on the beach after spending ridiculous amounts on ashtrays and coasters in the market at the station. The weather was fantastic and the ice cream was good. The coast was beautiful but the water was cold.
I'm back home in Sheffield now. I am tired and a bit drunk, and I don't know what to make of Geordies. I barely understand what they say, let alone what they mean. (I'll probably have to adopt a policy of 'nod and smile' like I did in Japan).

P.S: I got my first hit from AFRICA, from Senegal! I've been waiting for this. I'm also still waiting for my first Russian visitor, and a Chinese hit would be great, but I'm probably asking for too much there. Anyway, Bienvenue, Senegal.